This series of short video lectures examines the language of law as a central dimension of legal reasoning and interpretation. Through a realist and analytically grounded approach, the lessons investigate how legal concepts acquire meaning through use, institutional practices, and interpretative conflict. Key themes include realist accounts of the concept of law, competing notions of interpretative correctness, the role of habits in legal normativity, the psychological underpinnings of the rule of law, and the epistemic structure of decision-making in international protection proceedings. Collectively, the videos illuminate the linguistic, cognitive, and institutional dynamics that shape legal meaning and authority. These video lessons are produced within Task 4.8 (The Language of Law) under Work Package 4 of the ALF project.
The Concept оf Law From a Realist Perspective – Luca Malagoli
Topic: The Concept оf Law From a Realist Perspective
Speaker: Luca Malagoli
ALF Partner Institution: University of Genoa (Università Di Genova)
In this concise lesson, Luca Malagoli revisits the Realist definition of law and clarifies how Hart’s objections failed to account for the pragmatist background of Realist theory. He shows that for Realists, legal concepts function as heuristic devices whose significance lies in their practical effects. Malagoli also discusses the adversarial structure of legal interpretation, contrasting it with communicative models that assume cooperation. The lesson ultimately demonstrates that legal indeterminacy results from both linguistic vagueness and the structural dynamics of interpretative conflict.
Right Interpretative Answers: A Realist Analysis – Pierluigi Chiassoni
Topic: Right Interpretative Answers: A Realist Analysis
Speaker: Pierluigi Chiassoni
ALF Partner Institution: University of Genoa (Università Di Genova)
Pierluigi Chiassoni explores a taxonomy of interpretive correctness and shows how different legal actors justify their preferred interpretations. The lesson distinguishes between ontological correctness—according to which “the law itself” provides the right interpretation—and several descriptive forms of correctness grounded in legal practice, including methodological, ideological, jurisprudential, doctrinal, and cultural correctness. Through this typology, the author highlights the problematic nature of ontological correctness, arguing that no interpretation can be attributed to an objective entity such as “the law itself.” The lesson concludes that claims about “right answers” in law ultimately rely on institutional, ideological, or cultural standpoints, rather than on any independent, law-given meaning.
Habits in the Philosophy of Law – Marco Segatti
Topic: Habits in the Philosophy of Law
Speaker: Marco Segatti
ALF Partner Institution: University of Genoa (Università Di Genova)
In this video lesson, Marco Segatti critically examines Hart’s conventional view of habit and proposes a more sophisticated account of habitual action. He conceptualizes habits as intelligent, structured dispositions capable of organizing behavioral tendencies into stable and norm-responsive patterns. This framework allows him to answer Hart’s concerns about compulsion and normativity, illustrating how habitual behavior can be both voluntary and reflective. Segatti shows that habits play a central role in explaining coordinated social behavior, the justification of action, and the gradual development of principled commitments.
On the Psychological Basis of the Rule of Law – Marco Segatti
Topic: On the Psychological Basis of the Rule of Law
Speaker: Marco Segatti
ALF Partner Institution: University of Genoa (Università Di Genova)
In this short video lesson, Marco Segatti explores the psychological foundations underpinning Cesare Beccaria’s influential institutional model of the rule of law. He reconstructs Beccaria’s account of how citizens internalize legal norms and how predictable, impartial institutions shape lawful behavior. Segatti also highlights the limitations of Beccaria’s framework—particularly its overly linear view of human motivation—and introduces the idea of “institutional experimentalism” as a more dynamic alternative. The lesson shows how adaptive institutional design can better accommodate the complex psychological factors that influence legal compliance.
Knowledge In International Protection Proceedings – Elena Marchese
Topic: On the Psychological Basis of the Rule of Law
Speaker: Elena Marchese
ALF Partner Institution: University of Genoa (Università Di Genova)
In this concise lesson, Elena Marchese addresses the epistemic challenges surrounding evidence in international protection proceedings. By examining RH v Sweden, she reveals how tensions between competing knowledge systems shape judicial and administrative decision-making in asylum cases. Marchese warns that dismissing evidentiary questions as political matters prevents meaningful epistemological reflection. She argues for a more structured analysis of reasoning in this domain, aimed at strengthening argumentative rigor and enhancing the quality of protection assessments.